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Administrativeagencies are an increasingly prominent feature of the
legal system. This article presents a model of the behavior of such agen-
cies that can be tested empirically and the results of some preliminary
empirical tests.1 The model is designed to predict how a rational utility-
maximizing agency divides its attention among cases having different
characteristics. Part I develops the model, discusses and tests some em-
pirical implications, and compares the implications of the model with
alternative models. Part II uses the model developed in Part I as the basis
for an empirical examination of a long-standing issue in administrative
law —whethercombining prosecution and adjudication in the same agency
contaminates adjudication.
I wish to express my gratitude to George J. Stigler for his many helpful suggestions.
Helpful comments on previous drafts were also made by Gary S. Becker, Kenneth Cuip
Davis, Owen M. Fiss, Julius 0. Getman, William M. Landes, Bernard D. Meltzer, and the
participants in the industrial Organization Workshop of the University of Chicago. The
National Bureau of Economic Research provided financial support under a grant from the
National Science Foundation for research in law and economics.
I.I use the term "administrative agency" broadly to include any law-enforcement
agency whether or not independent of the executive branch of government. The model
developed here, however, is limited to the prosecutorial activities of administrative agencies.
Much of the analysis is applicable to conventional criminal law enforcement.
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THE BEHAVIOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
The agency's goal is assumed to be to maximize the utility of its law-
enforcement activity. The utility (or more precisely expected utility) of an
individual case is the public benefit, if prosecuted successfully, discounted
(multiplied) by the probability of successful prosecution. Discounting is
required in order to reflect the fact that a case is less worthwhile if, all
other things being equal, there is a smaller chance of the agency's winning
it.2 For simplicity, the agency is assumed to bring only two types of cases
(the cases within each type being homogeneous) and the number of cases
of each type is fixed. Both assumptions are unrealistic but only the second
has analytical significance and it will be relaxed later.
The agency maximizes expected utility by investing resources,
mostly lawyers' time, in prosecuting violators. The effectiveness of its
expenditures in enhancing the probability of successful prosecution and
hence utility of a case depends significantly on how much money the de-
fendant decides to spend in defending the case. Most simply,
(1)
where p is the probability of the agency's winning, cisthe agency's
litigation outlays, and c'thedefendant's. If the defendant spends nothing
on the litigation, the probability of the agency's winning becomes unity,
even if the agency spends very little. If the agency spends nothing, the
probability of its winning falls to zero. If both parties spend the same
amount, the probability of the agency's winning is 50 per cent.
This formulation is too simple, because it assumes that outcome is a
function solely of the ratio of the parties' litigation outlays. If the law is
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Equations (4) and
2. The bringing of unmeritorious cases imposes costs on innocent parties, comforts the
guilty, and weakens the deterrent effect of the law. Merit is not a dichotomous property and
is approximated by the probability of a successful outcome. The model could be altered to
recognize that on occasion a case may have value for an agency even if it ends in defeat.
An earlier mathematical model of law enforcement from which I have borrowed is
presented in William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, included in this
volume. Compare Alan E. Friedman, Note, An Analysis of Settlement, 22 Stan. L. Rev.
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than the defendant, a smaller expenditure by the agency may have a
greater impact on the outcome than a much larger expenditure by the
defendant (or vice versa). Equation 1 should be restated as
(2)
where eissome factor—it may be a fraction, or it may be larger than one
—that measures the effectiveness of the agency's litigation outlays in
influencing the outcome of a case in its favor.3 If ewere1.5, it would
follow that the agency had a 75 per cent chance of winning when both
parties spent the same amount of money on the case. If ewere2, the
agency would have a 67 per cent chance of winning even though the de-
fendant spent twice as much as the agency. However, since p cannot be
larger than 1,
(3)
In deciding how much money to invest in each type of case, the
agency cannot simply keep spending until a dollar of expenditure no
longer increases expected utility by a dollar. It is limited to its appropria-
tion from Congress. A budget constraint must therefore be added to the
model.






ac1 +bc2 =B. (5)
a and b are the number of cases of each type; B is the agency's budget;
and S1ands2 are the agency's gain, expressed in dollars,4 from successful
3. A better formulation would probably be p =(c/c + c' )P, Thiswould avoid the
necessity for a restriction on e(otherthan e >0)to prevent p from exceeding unity,
and would permit the proportional impact of e on p to vary with changes in c and c'.
James Meginniss has suggested an alternative formulation, p =ecic, whereeisthe agency's
probability of winning when c =c',that also has desirable properties. Unfortunately, either
formulation greatly increases the computational difficulties of the model, and the gain in
realism would not appear to have substantial analytical significance (but see text following
note 21, infra).
4. Although administrative proceedings rarely involve damages or any other readily
quantifiable remedy, it is plausible to suppose that an agency ranks its cases, at least im-
plicitly, in accordance with some rough estimate of the dollar equivalent, in public benefits
conferred, of a successful prosecution.
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prosecution. The budget constraint is expressed as an equation rather
than an inequality in view of the notorious reluctance of government
bodies to turn back unused funds to the Treasury.
Clearly, the agency's expenditure on a case is in part a function of
how much the defendant spends, and the reverse must also be true —the
defendant's expenditure is a function in part of the agency's expenditure.
Before we can use equations (4) and (5) to find the agency's optimal ex-
penditure on each case, we must know what the defendant is likely to
spend. This requires that we construct a model like equation (5) but from
the defendant's point of view.
Assume that, before the litigation, the defendant in a case of the sec-
ond type had a certain wealth position, W. Litigation will produce one of
two states of the world. If he wins, his wealth will be diminished only by
his litigation expenses; if he loses, his wealth will be diminished by his
stakes in the case as well. By discounting each state by the probability
of its occurrence, we can express his wealth position after litigation (W')
as follows:
= (W—+(1 — (W—— ci). (6)
The first expression on the right-hand side of the equation
+c2)isthe probability that the defendant will win rather than the
agency. It should be emphasized that(andtherefore like e2(and
therefore P2)isa subjective term: it is the defendant's estimate of the
effectiveness of his expenditures on the outcome of the suit. The parties
may have inconsistent estimates. Indeed, as we shall see, without such
differences there would be few litigated cases.
The defendant is assumed to operate without a budget constraint.
Unlike the agency, he can hire additional legal resources until their
marginal product falls to zero.
The reader may wonder why the stakes for the defendant, are
distinguished from the stakes for the agency in the same case, s2.The
reason is that they may not be identical. A clear instance of asymmetry is
presented by any monopoly case: the social costs of monopoly exceed
the private benefits to the monopolizer.5 To take another example, an
5.Themonopolist who cannot discriminate perfectly in price maximizes profits by
selling a smaller quantity at a higher price than under competition. His gain—the difference
between the monopoly and the competitive price multiplied by the number of Units sold—
is also a loss to the purchasers of this output. Another loss, which the monopolist does not
capture, is the loss to those consumers whom the higher, monopoly price deters from con-
tinuing to buy the monopolist's product, and who substitute other products that cost more,
or are otherwise less desirable, than the monopolist's product when sold at a competitive
price.
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order forbidding the mailing of a type of advertising brochure found to be
deceptive may be much more costly to a defendant who has already had
the brochure printed than to a defendant who has not, yet the order
against the second defendant is just as valuable to the agency as the order
against the first. Furthermore, an order may have importance to an agency
beyond any effect in abating the defendant's illegal conduct: as a prec-
edent. Precedent has a dual significance. It makes it easier for the agency
to win the next case (if a similar case), and it may deter others from engag-
ing in like conduct. The dismissal of a case will lack comparable signifi-
cance to the defendant unless he anticipates frequent future encounters
with the agency.6 Finally, since the benefits of administrative proceed-
ings frequently cannot be quantified, the agency's implicit valuation of
the fruits of a successful prosecution may differ substantially from the
costs to the defendant.
The first derivative of W' with respect tois
dW'
— 1 (7) +c2)2
By setting the derivative equal to zero and solving forwe can discover
how much money a defendant in our second type of case should spend in
order to maximize his wealth. That expenditure is
= — c2, (8)
whichimplies, not unrealistically, that if the defendant's stakes are rela-
tively small, an increase in c2 will induce him to reduce his expenditure
on the case, while if they are relatively large, it will induce him to increase
We may now return to equation (4) and determine the utility-maxi-
mizing expenditure of the agency on the same case. By substituting equa-
tion (8) into equation (4), solving equation (5) for c3 and substituting the
6. Such asymmetry is not limited to public law enforcement. In accident litigation, for
example, the usual defendants—insurance companies—have an interest in precedent that
is not shared by the accident claimants. Some evidence on the significance of this asym-
metry is presented in Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence,1 J. Leg. Studies 29,
94—96 (1972).
7. The rate of change ofwith respect to c2 is
ad—
ac2
This expression is negative (signifying that an increase inwill cause a decrease in
whenis relatively small, and positive when it is relatively large.220 THE BEHAVIOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
result into equation (4), and simplifying, we can restate equation (4) as
follows:
— \/B —bc2 (c2e2 E(U)— ,
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Bysetting the derivative equal to zero and solving for c2 we discover that
the expenditure by the agency on type 2 cases that maximizes the
agency's utility is
(11)
An objection to this method of determining the agency's optimum ex-
penditure is that while the agency, in deciding how much to spend on
prosecuting a case, takes account of the fact that the defendant's expendi-
ture is a function in part of how much the agency spends, the defendant
takes the agency's expenditure as given—he does not consider how the
agency might react to a change in his expenditure. The asymmetry is not
entirely unrealistic. The position of the parties is asymmetrical. The
agency is the moving party in the litigation and controls to a considerable
extent its timing and scope. The agency presumably has greater experi-
ence with respect to the particular kind of litigation involved than a de-
fendant who appears infrequently before it, although this disparity may be
offset to the extent that there are private lawyers who specialize in litiga-
tion before the particular agency. Finally, the agency is a bureaucracy
in which decisions and procedures presumably tend to be routinized.
These factors make it somewhat plausible that the agency, in deciding
what to spend on a case, will make a rough estimate of the defendant's
likely expenditures (viewed in part as a function of its own expenditures)
and the defendant will adjust to the level of the agency's expenditures. If
the defendant were assumed to have the same reaction function as the
agency's in the model, the optimum expenditure of both parties would be
indeterminate.8
8. This indeterminacy resembles that encountered by attempts to determine an oh-
gopolist's optimum price when he is assumed to act independently but to take account of his
rivals' reactions to his price changes. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price 2 17—19
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For understanding how changes in the characteristics of the agency's




IfB,a,and bareassumed to be constant any increase in c2mustre-
sult in a decrease in c1,andvice versa. If the agency's stakes (s1ands9)
arealso held constant, then it is clear from equation (12) that c2willfall
and c1riseif the effectiveness of the agency's expenditures falls in cases
of the second type or rises in cases of the first type; if the effectiveness of
defendants' expenditures falls in cases of the first type or rises in the
second type; or if defendants' stakes rise in the second type of case or fall
in the first type.
These factors are independent of the social benefits of successful pros-
ecution of type 2 cases. Even if those benefits are great—let us henceforth
assume that s2ismuch larger than s1— theymay be overwhelmed by other
factors that a rational utility-maximizing agency must take into account.
It is plausible, moreover, that ewillbe higher in a class of relatively
minor violations andsmallerin relation to s1thaninrelation to s2.
Theexplanation has to do with precedent. The public benefit from pro-
ceeding against a violation may be relatively small because the law is so
well settled that the case will have little importance as precedent. Pre-
cisely because the law is well settled, however, the probability of suc-
cessful prosecution, even without a large expenditure of resources, is
probably high. The rational agency will be especially attracted to cases
that have importance as precedent but in which the monetary stakes are
small. The usual defendant is uninterested in whether the outcome of his
case will have precedential significance. Since it would be surprising if
the precedential significance of a case increased in proportion to the
monetary stakes, sislikely to be smaller relative to s1thantos2.
Afrequent criticism of administrative agencies is that they mis-
oligopoly problem, and one with some relevance in the present context, is to treat it as a
problem of collusive rather than of independent action. See George J. Stigler, A Theory of
Oligopoly, 72 J. Pol. Econ. 44 (1964), reprinted in George J. Stigler, The Organization of
Industry 39 (1968); Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested
Approach, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1562 (1969). Like ohigopohists, litigants can increase their
wealth by agreeing to limit their rivalry, and specifically by agreeing to reduce their ex-
penditures on litigation. Agreements to stipulate rather than litigate facts are a common
example—but of this more later.222 THE BEHAVIOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
allocate their resources by bringing mostly small cases.9 But our model
suggests that under plausible assumptions concerning the characteristics
of the agency's cases, a perfectly rational, utility-maximizing administra-
tive agency will devote a "disproportionate" amount of its resources to
relatively minor cases. Lets1 andbe $10, e1 2,.9,and$40, e2 1.5,
1, a 20, b 5, and B $50. Solving equation (11) for c2, and (3) and (8)
for c1,andwe discover that the agency should spend $3.36 on each
case of the second type and $1.66 on each case of the first type. (The
defendant's optimum expenditure is found to be $8.44 in a case of the
second type and $2.14 in a case of the first type.) Although the aggregate
social benefits from cases of each type (i.e., as1, bs2) are equal—$200-..
the agency devotes two-thirds of its resources to cases of the first type.
And although each type 2 case involves four times the social benefits of
each type 1 case, the agency spends only twice as much money litigating
each case of the former type. This is optimizing behavior rather than a
manifestation of stupidity or timidity. The agency's utility would be less
if it allocated additional monies from its limited budget to the larger cases.
One factor inducing the agency to devote so many resources to cases
of the first type is the higher rate of success in such cases that it antici-
pates. Another, and related, factor is defendants' relative pessimism about
such cases (ei). A similar effect would also result if s.2' were higher than
as our earlier analysis suggests it might well be.
Substituting the results of our numerical example into equation (2),
we discover that the agency expects to win 87 per cent of its type 1 cases
but only 43 per cent of its type 2 cases. The defendants' expectations are
inconsistent with the agency's. To determine the objective probability of
the agency's winning let us assume that the parties are equally good (or




from which we can determine that the agency will win 68 per cent of its
type 1 cases and 36 per cent of its type 2 cases.
Table1presents some additional numerical examples. The last
column summarizes the example in the text.
9. See, e.g.,ABAComm'n to Study the Federal Trade Commission, Report, p. 1 (Sept.
15, 1969); Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government
(Hoover Commission), Appendix N, Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions 119
(Jan. 1949); Philip Elman, Administrative Reform of the Federal Trade Commission, 59
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s1($) 10 10 10 10 10 10
s($) 10 10 10 10 10 10
e 1 1 .9 .9 .9 .9
s2($) 40 40 40 40 40 40
40 80 50 50 40 40
e2 1 1 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.5
1 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1
a 20 20 20 20 20 20
b 5 5 5 5 5 5
B(S) 50 50 50 60 60 50
Dependent Variables
c2($) 5.00 3.33 3.11 3.74 4.78 3.36
9.15 13.01 9.97 10.61 9.37 8.44
c1($) 1.25 1.67 1.72 2.07 1.81 1.66
c($) 2.28 2.43 2.21 2.25 2.23 2.14
ac1($) 25 33.73 34.45 41.30 36.10 33.20
bc2($) 25 16.67 15.55 18.70 23.90 16.80
P2(%) 35 20 40 44 61 43
p,(%) 35 41 88 96 90 87
p2(%) 35 20 28 31 44 36
35 41 68 74 70 68
B. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE MODELS
Our model has several testable implications. Among them:
1. An agency will probably devote relatively greater resources, in the ag-
gregate, to small cases (as measured by the stakes) than to large.
2. However, it will devote more resources to each large case than to each
small one.
3. The dismissal rate will probably be different in different types of cases
and lower in the larger cases.
4. The average dismissal rate across all classes of case need not tend toward
50 per cent and may well be lower.224 THE BEHAVIOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Tables 2 and 3 use data relating to the Federal Trade Commission in a
preliminary test of these implications. The results in Table 2, which
shows how the FTC allocates its budget among its three classes of case
(antitrust cases, deceptive-practice cases, and textile and fur cases), are
consistent with the first and second implications. The FTC devotes about
one-third as many resources to textile and fur cases as to all other labeling
and advertising cases. And it devotes roughly as many resources to all
advertising and labeling cases as it does to antitrust, although virtually
everyone believes that the Commission's antitrust work involves p0-
tentially much greater social benefits than its efforts to prevent mis-
labeling and false advertising. The ratio of resources devoted to textile
and fur cases to resources devoted to antitrust is particularly striking.'0 o
At the same time the Commission spends more than five times as many
resources on the average antitrust case than on the average textile or 0 u
furcase. U
Textile and fur cases are brought under special statutes" that re-
quire little evidence to establish a violation. In addition, the stakes in
such cases are typically small. In our terminology, s and s' (the agency's
and the defendant's stakes, respectively) are low; e (the effectiveness of 2
theagency's expenditures in procuring an outcome favorable to it) is
high; and e' is low. All of these factors work to reduce c, the agency's
optimum expenditure per case, while the high e and low e' make these
cases, as a class, relatively more attractive to the agency (assuming it to
be a rational utility maximizer) than cases in which the difficulties of
establishing a violation are greater. This explains why the expenditure c
per textile and fur case is low but the aggregate expenditure on the class
of these cases high relative to their importance.
Table 3, which compares the dismissal rate in the FTC's antitrust
cases with the dismissal rate in all of its cases, supports the third and
fourthempirical implications of our model. The dismissal rates in different
classes of cases are different; they do not average out to 50 per cent; the
10. The ratio of big to little FTC cases is actually overstated in Table 2, since the
antitrust category includes the minor provisions of the Robinson-Patman amendments to
the Clayton Act, IS U.S.C. §i 13(c), (d), and (e) (1970). On the propensity of both the
FTC and the Antitrust Division of the Department ofJustice to emphasize minor violations,
see Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Comission, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 47 (1969);
Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. Law & Econ. 365
(1970).For some other evidence consistent with the implications of the model see Id.at
381 (table 11), 382 (table 12); Table 8, infra.
11.Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 68(1970); Fur Products Labeling Act, 15
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TABLE 3











1938 60 4 .12 .25
1941 61 15 .28 .60
1943 32 6 .22 .53
1945 43 6 .21 .33
1946—47 70 7 .21 .43
1949—50 53 10 .17 .40
1951—52 62 3 .19 .33
1955—56 36 12 .19 .25











S0uRCEs.—Federal Trade Commissioii Decisions, vols. 27, 33, 37, 40, 42—
43, 46, 48, 52, 56, 67—68.
aExcludingcases brought exclusively under one of the minor Robinson-Pat-
man amendments to the Clayton Act. See note 10, supra.
1)Significanttotal dismissals, as defined in text, infra, p. 240.
cOraverage.
average is in fact much lower; and the higher dismissal rate is found in the
class of larger cases.
Results from a single agency can hardly be considered conclusive;
and the classification of cases employed in Tables 2 and 3 is crude. The
tests can, however, be refined, and extended to other agencies.
The question arises whether alternative models of the administrative
process might not explain the evidence equally well. I believe not. The
model implicit in the standard criticism mentioned earlier (agencies spend
too much money on small cases) is that administrative agencies are not
competent utility maximizers. In that event, however, one would expect
the agency either to dismiss a high proportion of cases or suffer reversal
at the hands of reviewing courts in a high proportion of cases. In fact the
FTC fares extremely well on judicial review.12
12. See Table 16,infra.
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Another model characterizes the administrative agencies as tools of
effective political groups.'3 An implication of this model that I have dis-
cussed elsewhere is that the FTC can be expected to bring a large number
of questionable cases to harass the competitors of the firms or groups of
firms that dominate the agency.'4 Such cases would rather often end in
dismissal, either by the agency in anticipation of adverse court action or
by a reviewing court. We would therefore expect—but we do not observe
—a high dismissal or reversal rate.
C. THE MODEL MADE MORE REALiSTIC
In this subpart, several severely unrealistic assumptions made in subpart
A are progressively relaxed, and we ask what difference relaxing them
makes to the predictions derived from the original model.
1. NUMBER OF CASES AS AN ADDITIONAL CHOICE VARIABLE
We assumed that the number of cases of each type brought by the agency
was fixed, but in fact the agency, within the limits of its budget, can bring
as many or as few of each type of case as it wants. Once we admit nasa
choice variable along with c,wemust further modify our original model to
take account of the fact that the probability of an agency's winning its
/2th case will decline as nincreases,other things being equal. Within any
size class of cases, there will be some violations that can be detected and
proved with relative ease and others that require much more investigative
and litigative effort. Thus, the more cases in the class that the agency de-
cides to bring, the more it will be forced to seek out cases that are more
difficult to win with the same expenditure of resources.'5 Figure 1 illus-
trates this relationship. The area under the curve to the left of the broken
line is the cumulative probability (as estimated by the agency) of winning
n,cases,given equal expenditures per case. If this area is multiplied by
s,,theproduct is the agency's expected utility from bringing n,cases.If it
brings more cases its expected utility will increase but at a declining rate.
13. SeeGeorgeJ. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Man-
agement Sci. 3 (1971).
14. See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, supranote10, at 70—71.
15. The negative slope of p(n) is reinforced by two other factors, First, the more cases
of a given type an agency brings, the larger will be the body of applicable precedents and
this will tend to reduce uncertainty and so increase the proportion of cases that are settled
(the determinants of settlement are discussed in detail later): contested cases will be scarcer.
Second, bringing more cases is likely to increase the deterrent effect of the law. With the
risk of being prosecuted greater, fewer violations will be committed and this will make it
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These new assumptions could be incorporated into a revised alge-
braic formulation of the agency's utility function, but such a formulation
turns out to be quite awkward to manipulate. For our purposes a graphic
approach (Figure 2) is sufficient. Dollars, on the vertical axis, are plotted
against number of cases on the horizontal axis. Cases of type I are to the
left of the vertical axis and cases of type 2 to the right. Assume a new
agency, groping its way to the optimum combination of c's and n's by a
process of trial and error. It begins by selecting a point somewhere to the
right of the vertical axis (it could just as well, however, have begun on
the left side). That point (c2n2)determinesboth the number of cases of
type 2 that the agency will bring and the expenditure it will make on each







16. The assumption that the agency will spend the same amount of money on cases
having different probabilities of success is somewhat arbitrary. Assume that the probability
of the agency's winning the first case is .9 and of winning the nth case .6, and that an addid into a revised alge-
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To every point on either side of the vertical axis, there corresponds a
unique function, of the kind depicted in Figure 1 but now multiplied by s,
that determines the expected utility of bringing a particular number of
cases and spending a particular amount of money on each one. The ex-
pected-utility function for c2n2inthe diagram is the curve AB.Thearea
tional expenditure of $1 per case would increase these probabilities by .1. Assuming
stant s, the $1 increment will produce a larger gain in expected utility in the first case than
in the second (.1 x.9s, or.09s,comparedto .1 X .6s, or .06s). This would seem to suggest
that the agency would be better off spending more of the increment on the first case and less
on the However, an additional expenditure on a case in which the agency's chances of
winning are already high may increase those chances less than the same expenditure would
increase the agency's chances in a case where those chances would otherwise be poor. At
all events, Figure 2 could be modified to give the c's a negative slope, and the analysis
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between that curve and the baseline is the expected utility of bringing n2
casesand spending c2oneach one. Notice that while the curve must lie in
the same vertical plane as c2n2,itneed not, and ordinarily will not, touch
c2n2.Thereis no presumption that the expenditure on the iith case is
equal to the expected utility of bringing that case. It may be lower; as-
suming a tight budget constraint, it may very well be higher (as in the
diagram).
The curve PG on the left side of the diagram represents the locus of
points c1ti1equalto B —c2n2, thesum of the rectilinear areas c1n1and
c2n2beingthe constant B. To every point on that curve there again cor-
responds some unique expected-utility function. We assume the agency
selects the c1n1shownin the diagram, with its corresponding utility func-
tion DE.
It is no accident that in the diagram c1isbelow c2andDE both below
and flatter than AB. Recall that type 2 comprises the larger cases and type
1 the smaller. Since cisan increasing function of s,c.2 willusually (not
always) be larger than C1whens2>s1.Sincethe expected-utility func-
tions are the product of stimesp, A may well be higher than E even if p1
is greater than P2. The only nonobvious assumption is that DE is flatter
than AB, signifying that the probability, of the agency's winning declines
more slowly, as more cases are brought, in the class of smaller than in the
class of larger cases. This is plausible. It implies that the universe of
major violations is smaller than the universe of minor ones. The ratio of
all transactions that can plausibly be characterized as monopolization in
violation of the antitrust laws to those such transactions against which
proceedings are instituted is doubtless much smaller than the comparable
ratio for consumer frauds. If so, bringing an additional monopolization
case (and spending no more money on it than was spent on the last such
case) probably involves a larger drop in the probability of a successful
outcome for the agency than would bringing an additional fraud case.
Figure 2 illustrates how, on these assumptions, the agency that
takes a critic's advice to "reorder its priorities" by bringing more big
cases and spending more money on each one may actually reduce its
overall effectiveness. By moving to 17 theagency increases its ex-
pected utility from bringing cases of type 2 to the area under the curve
A'B', but this reduces the resources it can devote to cases of type 1 to
the locus of points on F'G'. Suppose isthe point that generates the
largest expected utility (the area under the curve D'E'). Partly because
the expected-utility functions for cases of class 1 are flatter than those for
cases of class 2 the result of this reallocation of resources is to reduce
17. The prime marks here do not refer to defendants' expenditures.
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Relaxing the assumption that the number of cases of each type
brought by the agency is fixed thus reinforces rather than undermines
the implications of the primitive model. The analysis that underlies Figure
2 not only suggests why (as we have observed) the FTC brings many
more small cases than large but also why it seems to devote excessive re-
sources to small cases in the aggregate.
2. BUDGET AS AN ENDOGENOUS TERM
So far we have assumed that the agency's budget, or overall resources,
is an exogenous variable, meaning that it is not affected by changes in the
variables that the agency controls, the c's and n's. There is some evidence
that administrative agency budgets do in fact contain a large exogenous
element,18 but they cannot be wholly exogenous. The agency that brought
no cases or lost every case it brought would surely suffer a reduction in
its budget.
To illustrate the consequences of abandoning the assumption that B
is exogenous, let us assume that it tends to rise as the agency's work load
rises (as discussed more fully later, discussion of work load in fact
dominates congressional hearings on appropriations for administrative
agencies) but to fall if the agency's batting average (j3) falls (otherwise an
agency that wanted a larger budget would bring cases without regard to
their merit). The agency and the appropriating body are also interested,
presumably, in s, but this does not affect the analysis.
This model has the same implications as Figure 2. As in Figure 2, the
agency has an incentive to increase ii but this incentive is held in check
by the negative impact on p of a higher n if the slope of p(n) is steep.
Thus, that slope, which I have suggested provides additional reason for
expecting an agency to concentrate major resources on small cases, re-
mains a vital element in the agency's utility function.
3. SETTLEMENTS
Our original model excluded the possibility of a settlement without trial.
Not only is this unrealistic, but it invites the objection that the predictions
of the primitive model may be incorrect. If, for example, large cases are
18.This isstrikingly shown in a study by George J. Stigler, whofoundthat changes in
agency budgets are much more closely correlated with each other than with differences
in the size or rate of growth of the respective industries regulated. George J. Stigler, The
Process of Economic Regulation, 17 Antitrust Bull. 207, 218 (1972).whatever causes the c
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more apt to be settled than small, this would imply that the former are
relatively cheap to prosecute, and a rational utility-maximizing agency
will therefore allocate greater resources to large cases than the primitive
model predicted. We must consider the conditions under which a case will
be tried rather than settled.
The minimum offer that a rational plaintiff will accept in settlement of
his claim is his expected gain from litigation minus his litigation expenses
(which would reduce his net gain from suit) plus the costs of negotiating
the settlement. The maximum offer that the defendant will tender is what
he expects to owe the plaintiff after the litigation (the stakes to the de-
fendant discounted by the probability, in the defendant's eyes, of the
plaintiff's winning) plus his litigation expenses (which he would lose any-
way) minus his settlement costs. For a settlement to take place, the plain-
tiff's minimum settlement price must not exceed the maximum that the
defendant is willing to pay. If it is larger there will be no settlement. I
assume that settlement cost is some fraction of each party's litigation
costs—the same fraction.
The condition for litigation may therefore be expressed as follows:
— >(i +c' (14)
which simplified (with the help of equation (8)) becomes
(15)
Thelarger the ratio of s' to s the likelier a settlement. (The intuitive ex-
planation is that the prospect of a large loss induces the defendant to
make an offer that the agency, with the prospect of a relatively small gain
from litigation, finds attractive.) And for reasons explained earlier that
ratio may be larger in big cases than in small. Notice, however, that when
e' > 1, the same percentage increase in s and s' will reduce the likelihood
of settlement by making the first term in brackets a larger negative num-
ber.
An increase in settlement costs relative to litigation costs (falling k)
reducesthe right-hand side of inequality (15):litigationbecomes more
likely.'9 An increase in e' (the effectiveness of the defendant's litigation
outlays) produces a more complex effect, but in general the decline in the
first term in brackets will exceed the rise in the second term. However,
it is unrealistic to assume that if e' rises e will remain unchanged, for
19. For some evidence of this effect see Richard A. Posner, supranote6, at 94—96.-
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whatever causes the defendant to revise his chances upward should
cause the agency to revise its chances downward. We can investigate this
possibility by assuming that the sum of the parties' estimates of their
chances of prevailing is a constant ((ec)/(c + c') + (e'c')/(c + c') =r),so
that any increase in e' must be offset by a decrease in e. As shown in the
appendix at the end of this article, in the special case where r =I,k >1
(settlement costs are lower than litigation costs), and s' =s,there will
always be a settlement, whether e' rises or falls. Intuitively, when the
parties' estimates sum to 100 per cent, it means that they agree on the out-
come, so a settlement can readily be negotiated.20
The more interesting case is where r >1.Assuming that k is large
and s' =s,the condition for litigation is (approximately)
Vc
(16)
This would seem to indicate that litigation becomes more likely as e'
decreases and less likely as it increases. But this is misleading. A decrease
in e' and increase in e will produce an increase in c (equation (ii)): thus
the right-hand side of the inequality will also decrease. What is clear is
that an increase in r, which measures the divergence of the parties' predic-
tions of success, will increase the likelihood of litigation. An increase in
the stakes (s) will also increase the likelihood of litigation —aprediction
that has some empirical support.2'
Thus far we have assumed that the effectiveness of a dollar expended
in litigation (e) is a constant that is unaffected by the number of dollars
expended, which is unrealistic. In particular, there is probably a threshold
below which expenditures on litigation have no, or negligible, effective-
ness. If the defendant's threshold expenditure is larger than his stakes in
the case, he will not contest the agency's case and the case will be classi-
fied as a settlement. To be sure, assuming that the agency has the same
threshold, it will not be able to make a credible threat of suing in order to
induce the defendant not to contest unless the agency's stakes (unlike the
defendant's) exceed the threshold. But since s may be larger than s',
20. Assuming (as incidentally I do throughout the paper) that neither party is a risk
preferrer. The relevance of attitude toward risk to the likelihood of settlement is discussed
in William M. Landes, p. 171.
21. The FTC settles smafl cases more frequently than large. (Compare Tables 3 supra
and12 infrawithTable A3 in the appendix.) But this could be because the outcome of
antitrust cases—the large cases, in our statistics—is less predictable than that of de-
cases (the small cases in our statistics): the rmaybe greater.234 THE BEHAVIOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
there will be cases where this condition is fulfilled. These will be small
cases, since the threshold litigation expenditure must exceed s'.Hereis
then another reason for expecting settlements to include a dispropor-
tionately large number of sinai!cases,consistently with the predictions
of the primitive model.
If we solve inequality (15), using the values in our earlier numerical
example and assigning a value of 5tok(signifyingthat the costs of settle-
ment are one-fifth of the costs of trial) we find that type 1 cases will not
be settled. This is not because the parties have different stakes (s1and
arethe same) but because they disagree sharply about the outcome.
The agency estimates the probability of its winning at 87 per cent, while
defendants estimate the agency's probability of winning at only 51 per
cent. In cases of the second type, where the spread is smaller (the
agency estimates its probability of winning at 43 per cent and the de-
fendant estimates the agency's probability of winning at 28 per cent) the
parties do settle. Although arbitrary, the numerical example suggests
roughly how great a difference there must be between the parties' esti-
mates of probability, given moderate settlement costs and equal stakes,
for litigation to occur. Additional examples (again with k= 5) arepre-
sented in Table 4.
In the numerical example, the larger difference in the parties' esti-
mates of their chances of success was in the smaller case but this is an
accident of the numbers. On the one hand, prediction is more difficult the
more complex a case is, and complexity is in part a function of size
(though even more of novelty). On the other hand, the greater legal re-
sources deployed in the larger case may result in narrowing the area of
uncertainty about the outcome.
Our discussion of settlements assumes that the parties cooperate to
maximize their joint utility. Our discussion of litigation assumed that
TABLE 4
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theymake independent, noncooperating decisions on their litigation out-
lays, even though, by agreeing to reduce those outlays, both would be
made better off. The dichotomy corresponds at least to casual observa-
tion of the operation of the legal system. In a very large class of cases the
parties agree to settle in advance of trial and thereby avoid all costs of
trial. In cases that are tried, the parties frequently do stipulate to many of
the facts essential to the proceeding in order to avoid the costs of having
to establish the facts by testimony in court, but such side agreements ap-
pear to be less common than settlements and to avoid a smaller proportion
of the total costs of going to law. Possibly the transaction costs involved
in agreements to curtail the trial process are relatively high, especially
since the cases that are not settled —aminority of all cases —areby defini-
tion those in which an effort at a meeting of the minds failed. In general,
then, a model of cooperative decision making seems more appropriate in
the settlement context, and a model of independent decision making more
appropriate in the litigation context.
II. DOES COMBINING PROSECUTION AND
ADJUDICATION IN THE SAME AGENCY
CONTAMINATE ADJUDICATION?
A. THE ELMAN THEsIs
An old debate in administrative law—over whether the combination of
prosecution and adjudication in a single agency contaminates adjudica-
tion22—has recently been revived by Philip Elman, a distinguished
former member of the Federal Trade Commission. In a recent article, he
points to several specific characteristics of an administrative agency that
make the combination of these functions likely, in his judgment, to create
unfairness:
1. A high rate of dismissals is a confession of ineptitude on the part
of the members of the agency, who authorized the bringing of the
cases in the first place.
2. It is a rebuff to the staff that investigated and prosecuted the case
22: I use "combination of functions" to mean that an agency initiates the cases that it
decides, not that members of the Commission participate in the actual prosecution or that
members of the prosecutorial staff participate (other than through briefs and oral argument)
in the decision. The latter forms of combination have long been considered highly improper,
and to my knowledge have never characterized the agencies I shall be discussing.
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-
on the agency's behalf—a staff on which the members of the
agency depend.
3.It encourages noncompliance with the statute that they are com-
mitted to enforcing.23
Although plausible, this reasoning is hardly compelling. It can
equally well be argued that an agency will be motivated to review con-
tested cases scrupulously in order to keep the staff on its toes and mini-
mize the likelihood of reversal by a reviewing court. Furthermore, if it is
true that an agency measures its success by the number of cease and de-
sist orders entered, it will refuse to dismiss complaints regardless of
whether it, its delegate, or a complete outsider brought the case initially.
Nor can we resolve doubt in favor of Professor Elman's position on
the ground that it is implicitly based on his extensive personal observation
as a member of the Trade Commission. What he observed is that Com-
mission members frequently lack the fair-mindedness expected of
judges; and this bears hardly at all on the issue under discussion. Are
Federal Trade Commissioners more biased than the average judge?
Would they be less biased if they sat on a court rather than on the Com-
mission or if their authority over the issuance of complaints were re-
moved?
B. TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ELMAN THESIS
The Elman thesis has several testable implications:
1. An agency in which prosecution and adjudication are separated
will dismiss a higher fraction of the cases it decides than one in
which these functions are united, other things being equal.
2. When an agency in which these functions are combined does dis-
miss a complaint, it will tend to do so in a manner that avoids an
acknowledgment that the agency erred in initially authorizing the
complaint.
3. Such an agency will be more reluctant to dismiss a case in which
the issues are primarily factual than one in which the issues are
primarily legal.
4. It will be more reluctant to dismiss a big case—big in terms of the
amount of agency resources invested in it—than a small one.
5.Itwill be more reluctant to dismiss a complaint that the current
23. See Philip Elrnan, supranote9, at 810. To similar effect see Richard A. Posner,
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6. The decrees of an agency in which the functions arc combined will
be reversed more frequently on judicial review than those of an
agency in which the functions are separated.
7. In congressional hearings on an agency's appropriation requests,
and in other scrutinies of the agency's performance, the agency's
dismissal rate will receive greater emphasis than its rate of re-
versal on judicial review if prosecution and adjudication are com-
bined in the agency.
These hypotheses can be explored using data from the major
federal administrative agencies concerned primarily with the prosecution
of law violators —theFederal Trade Commission and the National Labor
Relations Board. The Commission has never relaxed its authority over
the issuance of complaints. The Labor Board's authority, in contrast, has
progressively diminished.24 Prior to October 1942 all complaints had to
be formally approved by the Board. Beginning with that date the Board's
Regional Directors were authorized to issue complaints without first
notifying the Board or obtaining its approval, unless a novel question of
fact or law was presented, and in the first year of operation under the new
system 70 per cent of all complaints were issued without a reference to
the Board.25 The Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 carried separation one step
further by making the General Counsel of the Board a presidential ap-
pointee rather than an employee of the Board and by giving him exclu-
sive authority over the issuance of complaints.26 This sequence affords
interesting opportunities for comparison among different periods of the
Labor Board as well as between Board and Commission.
C. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
1. Elman implies that any bias created by the combination of prose-
cution and adjudication will show up in a reduced dismissal rate. Our
original model supports this view. Substituting equation (8) (defendant's
optimum litigation outlay) into equation (13) (the true probability of the
agency's winning), and rearranging some terms, we have
24. See U.S. Atty. Gen.'s Committee on Administrative. Procedure, Administrative
Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 22—23 (1941); 3
NLRB Ann. Rep. 5 (1938); Ida Klaus, The Taft-Hartley Experiment in Separation of
NLRB Functions, 11 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 371, 372—74 (1958).
25. See 7 NLRB Ann. Rep. 12, n.5 (1942); 8 NLRB Ann. Rep. 13 (1943).
26. See § 2(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970).238 THE BEHAVIOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
The effect of introducing bias in the agency's favor is to increase e and
decrease e', making both terms on the right-hand side of the equation
larger.
In the more complex model illustrated in Figure 2, the effect on the
dismissal rate of an increase in e and a corresponding decrease in e' is
not so easy to predict. Typically the immediate consequence will be to
shiftall of the expected-utility functions upward. If each increases
equally and c1n1 and c2n2 were optimum points before the shift, the
agency has no reason to move to different points and Pt and P2 (and
thereforeand willincrease (the dismissal rate will fall). But a
change in e ande' could well affect different utility functions differently.
In that event the agency might alter its cnpointsand the new points might
involve a larger n and a lower probability of success in the nth case than
before the shift. Still, an increase in e accompanied by a decrease in e'
will ordinarily reduce the agency's dismissal rate, for the increase in the
agency's overall dismissal rate due to bringing some additional cases is
unlikely to equal or exceed the decrease in that rate due to a higher e and
lower e' in all of its cases.
One effect of a declining e' that we do notpredictis a change in the
settlement rate. Any bias introduced by combination of functions would
presumably be perceived by both parties roughly equally: the r of in-
equality (16) would not change.
Table 5 presents dismissal rates for more than 1,100 NLRB unfair
labor practice cases and FTC cases, drawn from randomly selected
volumes of the agencies' official decisions for various periods since
1938.27 It reveals that the Commission's dismissal rate has in general
been a good deal higher than the Board's both before and after 1947, while
the Board's has actually decreased since the creation of the independent
General Counsel. Little significance, however, can be ascribed to these
27. Decisions arepublishedin these volumes in the chronological order in which they
were issued. While a volume of NLRB decisions ordinarily covers no more than two
months, an FTC volume will usually cover an entire year's decisions. My procedure was
first to select volumes of NLRB decisions at random from various periods, concentrating
on the years immediately before and immediately after a change in the Board's structure
with respect to separation of functions, and then to select the contemporaneous FTC
volume. I omitted the very early years of the Board's decisions on the ground that its early
experience might be unrepresentative; however, some evidence on the earliest period is
presented in Tables 8 and 11 and note 34, infra.Iomitted 1969 in the case of the FTC
because its decisions for that year had not yet appeared in a printed volume and because it
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SouRces—Decisions and Orders of the National Labor Relations Board, vols. 8, 35,
51, 60, 69, 72, 87, 91, 95, 115, 127, 153, 178; Federal Trade Commission Decisions, vols.
27,33, 37, 40, 42—43, 46, 48, 52,56, 67—68.
aOraverage.
Exclusion of 1969 FTC cases, in this and subsequent tables, is explained in note 27,
supra.240 THEBEHAVIOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
findings. Table 1 counts as a dismissal any case in which, and for what-
ever reason, any part of the complaint was dismissed.28 Many are unim-
portant partial dismissals. And complaints are frequently dismissed in
circumstances where the outcome seems better characterized as a victory
for the agency than as a victory for the defendant, such as where the de-
fendant has discontinued the unlawful practice in circumstances where
resumption seems highly unlikely.
Table 6 organizes the dismissal data in a more discriminating manner.
Dismissals that, for the reasons just stated, are not really significant are
excluded. According to Table 6 the NLRB's dismissal rate is approxi-
mately the same in the period before and in the period after 1947. If
partial dismissals are included the FTC's dismissal rate is lower than the
Board's in both periods. If partial dismissals are excluded the Com-
mission's dismissal rate is very slightly higher than the Board's in both
periods.
Although the relative dismissal rates of the Labor Board and the
Trade Commission do not support the Elman position, neither do they
refute it, sinceji (and hence 1 --ji, thedismissal rate) is, as we know from
our model, influenced by variables whose values cannot be assumed to be
the same in two so dissimilar agencies as the Labor Board and the Trade
Commission.29 But even if they cannot be used for direct comparison of
the agencies, Tables 5 and 6 illuminate our question in two respects.
First, a good deal of the sense that administrative adjudication is
biased against defendants stem from a reaction to the low dismissal
rates that characterize administrative adjudication. Instinctively we may
think that in a "fair" system of adjudication the dismissal rate would tend
toward 50 per cent. Our model of the behavior of administrative agencies
shows, however, that a perfectly fair agency might nonetheless dismiss
far fewer than 50 per cent of its cases. Tables 5 and 6 reinforce the im-
pression that this is a general feature of administrative adjudication,
rather than a distinctive attribute of agencies that have specific sources of
contamination such as combination of functions.
28. A case in which there was a partial dismissal is counted twice—once in the order
column and once in the dismissal column.
29. For this reason I have relegated to the appendix at the end of this article a table that
compares the dismissal rate in contested cases brought by the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice and in contested antitrust cases brought by the FTC—the area of
overlap between the jurisdictions of the two agencies. Table Al shows, for what it is worth,
that an antitrust defendant is as likely to convince the Commission to dismiss the complaint
against him as he is to convince a court to dismiss a similar complaint.brought by the De-
partment, although the functions of prosecution and adjudication are completely separate
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SOURCES. —See Table 5, supra.
a Asdefined in text.
bOraverage.F
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Second, it may be relevant that the disparity between dismissals and
significant dismissals should be so much greater for the Commission than
for the Board (indeed, virtually all total dismissals by the Board are sig-
nificant in my sense of that term). The reason for the disparity is simply
that it is not the Board's practice formally to dismiss a complaint when the
defendant has discontinued the unlawful practice and resumption is un-
likely —theusual ground of "nonsignificant" dismissal of a complaint in
its entirety by the Commission. This procedural difference between the
agencies is trivial but it is the opposite of what one would expect if Elman
were correct, given that it is the Commission, not the Board, that issues
as well as adjudicates complaints. Were the Commission highly sensitive
to criticisms that dismissal of a complaint was an acknowledgment that
the taxpayer's money had been wasted in bringing the case, it would
seek wherever possible to avoid characterizing its action in closing a case
as a dismissal. The Commission need not issue and print in its official
decisions a formal order dismissing the complaint in every case where it
finds entry of a formal order to cease and desist to be unnecessary.
Tables 5 and 6 allow a comparison among the several stages of the
separation of functions at the Board. Table 7 summarizes the dismissal
rates for each of the stages—before 1942, between 1943 and 1947, and
since 1947.
The dismissal rate is higher in the two later periods, when prosecu-
tion and adjudication were separated, than in the first period, when they
were not. This is consistent with Elman's thesis. The dismissal rate in the
most recent period, that of formal separation, is lower than in the previ-
ous period, that of limited delegation to the Board's staff of authority to


















1938—41 51 19 6 .37 .12
1943—47 89 40 21 .45 .24
1949—69 482 195 88 .40 .18
Sounca.—Table 5, supra.
a Asdefined in text.
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several stages of the
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these findings, however, is impaired by the limitations of our sample. The
volumes of the official decisions of the Board from which it was drawn
underrepresentthe number of dismissals becausethey omit dismissals
by hearing examiners that are not appealed to the Board. We can correct
for this omission and also obtain complete statistics of the Board's actions
ratherthanstatistics based upon a samplebyrearranging certain statistics
in the Board's annual reports.30 Table 8 presents the results of these
manipulations. Also, by being limited to unfair labor practices committed
by employers, Table 8 corrects for the principal modifications in the law
administered by the Labor Board that were made by the Taft-Hartley
Act.31
Table8 overrepresents the number of contested orders entered
against defendants by including cases in which the defendant filed ex-
ceptions to the trial examiner's recommended decision but did not file a
brief—a course of action inconsistent with a serious effort to overturn the
examiner's decision. (Such cases were omitted from the count of con-
tested cases in the earlier tables.) At all events, there are marked dis-
parities between the results in the previous tables and the results in Table
8. In particular, Table 8 indicates a substantial increase in the dismissal
rate, however computed, after 1947. But this may not have been the re-
suit of separation of functions. The model developed in Part I of this
30. The FTC volumes, in contrast, record all dismissals; and a single volume covers a
much longer period in the Commission's decisional process, thus reducing sampling error.
All of the periods shown in Tables 5 and 6 of FTC decisions are a full 12 months, with the
following exceptions: 1938 (seven months), 1941 (five months), 1943 and 1945 (six months
each) and 1946-1947 (18 months).
31. Two related tables are printed in the appendix. Table A2 presents dismissals and
withdrawals (often a charge is withdrawn because the Board's staff advises that it will not
recommend a complaint) of charges, prior to formal issuance of a complaint, as percentages
of total charges pending on the Board's docket. The table is relevant to the possible conten-
tion that a higher dismissal rate as a result of separating the prosecutorial and adjudicative
functions might manifest itself at the precomplaint stage. Although Table A2 does reveal a
rising precomplaint dismissal-withdrawal rate over time, the rate actually fell in the years
immediately following the formal separation effected by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. A
possible explanation for the secular rise in the rate—that a rising proportion of charges is
being filed by individuals rather than unions and the proportion of meritorious claims is
typically higher among union-initiated than among individually initiated charges—is ex-
plored with negative results in Table A2.
Table A3 shows the FTC's dismissal rate as a percentage of all cases, and of all dis-
positions including informal settlements, to permit comparison with Table 8—although, for
reasons noted earlier, a direct comparison between the two agencies is extremely difficult.
The caption "stipulations" in Table A3 refers to the only mode of informal settlement for
which statistics are regularly reported. Stipulations were discontinued in the early 1960s.
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article predicts a positive correlation between agency resources and
number of cases brought. A budget increase might produce an increase
in dismissal rate if the change in the number of cases was large in relation
to the resource change —ifin other words the new resources went mostly
to increasing nratherthan to increasing c(andhence p). This may be the
explanation of the post-1947 increase in the dismissal rate.
A simple index of changes in the Board's resources during the four
periods covered by Table 8 can be constructed by first distributing the
Board's employees (by means of a simple weighting factor 32)betweenits
unfair labor practice business and its other business during the period,
and then dividing the number of employees thus allocated to unfair labor
practices enforcement in each period by the number of unfair labor prac-
tice charges lodged with the Board during that period. Table 9 translates
the resulting quotients into an index in which the agency's resources in the
first period, 1935—4 1, equals 100.
Table 9 reveals that the agency's resources for dealing with unfair
labor practices declined slightly in the period 1943—47 as compared with
the prior period and that this decline was attended by a sharp drop in the
number of contested cases and in the dismissal rate. In the next period the
agency's resources increased, but the number of contested cases in-
creased even more, and the dismissal rate rose. In the latest period, when
both resources and the dismissal rate have fallen, the number of contested
cases increases so markedly as to suggest a profound change either in the
agency's productivity or in the character of its unfair labor practice cases.
According to Table 9, the Board actually expended fewer resources
per case in the period 1948—52 than in the previous period—which, quite
apart from the higher n,wouldlead us to predict an increase in the dis-
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32. The business of the Board consists primarily of two types of cases—unfair labor
practice cases and representation cases. Representation cases apparently consume, on
average, somewhere between 20 and 40 per cent of the agency resources required by the
average unfair labor practice case. See Labor-Federal Security Appropriations Bill for
1948, Hearings before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 866 (1947); Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropria-
tions for 1968, Hearings before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., ptI at 835 (1967); Departments of Labor, and Health, Education, and
Welfare Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1969, Hearings before the Subcomm. of the H.
Comm. on Appropriations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 481 (1968). 1 equated representation to
unfair labor practice cases at the rate of 3.5 representation cases to one unfair labor practice
case. A problem was created by a third class of Board cases, union.authorization cases,
which bulked large in the Board's activity in the third period covered by Table 8. I used
two exchange rates— 3.5 and 4—producing the range shown in the table.246 THEBEHAVIOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
greater increase in n(possiblebecause B has increased) could increase
the agency's expected utility while reducing the average probability of
its winning the cases that it brings.
2. If Elman's thesis is correct, an agency in which prosecution and
adjudication are joined should be sensitive to possible criticism of a dis-
missal as an acknowledgment that the agency erred at the complaint-
issuance stage. If so, we would expect such an agency, when it does dis-
miss a complaint, frequently to do so without acknowledging failure to
establish a violation. It may feel compelled to dismiss a complaint that
cannot possibly withstand judicial review but it need not cast its dismissal
in the form of a potentially damaging admission. A dismissal in which
there is no acknowledgment that a violation was not established will be
called a "grudging" dismissal.
I have found no grudging dismissals among the decisions of the
Board. Table 10, which compares ungrudging with significant dismissals
by the FTC, suggests that the grudging dismissal is an important feature
of the Commission's decision-making process. That many dismissals of
FTC cases, and none of NLRB cases, are grudging may appear to con-
TABLE 9
RESOURCE CONSTRAINT AND DISMISSAL RATE—NLRB UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICE CASES
Index of Index of % of
Available Number of Contested
Resources Contested Index (1) ÷ Cases
Period (1) Cases (2) Index (2) Dismissed
1935—41 100 100 1.00 .16
1943—47 97 80 1.21 .13
1948—52 102—107 121 .84—.88 .23
1955_698 87 296 .29 .21
SOURCES.—See Table 8, supra;alsoU.S. Presidents, Bureau of the Budget,
Budget of the United States Government, fiscal yrs. 1935—1969; Hearings before
the Subcomm. of the Senate and House Comms. on Appropriations on NLRB
appropriations for fiscal yrs. 1935—1969 (earlier hearings are included with the
Independent Offices Appropriations Bill hearings from the 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
(fiscal yr. 1943) and later are included with the Department of Labor Appropria-
tions Bill hearings).
aTheyears1955—56, 1959—60, 1961—62, 1965—66,and 1968—69 were used
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firmthe Elman thesis. However, grudging dismissals were unknown at the
Board even before the first separation of functions in October 1942, and
are a much smaller fraction of all FTC significant dismissals after 1945
thanuntil then. Most grudging dismissals are so classified because the
Commission gave no reason for its action in dismissing, and this ap-
pears to be an aspect of the Commission's early and much criticized
reticence about explaining the basis of its decisions, whether punitive
or exculpatory.33 The practice of "blind" dismissals begins to wane in
1946 and disappears after 1952. In the three later periods in Table 10
only two out of 42 significant dismissals (24 total dismissals) are grudging.
33. See, e.g.,GerardC. Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission 334—35 (1924),
and, with specific reference to the Commission's failure to state the reasons for dismissals,
U.S. Atty. Gen.'s Committee on Administrative Procedure, .supranote24, at 136—37, and
U.S. Atty. Gen.'s Committee on Administrative Procedure, The Federal Trade Com-
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TABLE 10
FORM OF FTC DISMISSALS
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% of as a % as a %
Total % of Un-Total Un- of All of All
Contested grudging agrudgingSignificantSignificant
Period Cases DismissalsDismissalsDismissalsDismissals
1938 60 .10 .03 .50 .71
1941 61 .05 .05 .82 .82
1943 32 .09 .06 .63 .71
1945 43 .07 .05 .73 .78
Totalb 196 M8 MS 69
1946—47 70 .20 .16 .22 .27
1949—50 53 .17 .13 .18 .22
1951—52 62 .23 .18 .07 .08
1955—56 36 .28 .19 .00 .00
1959—60 58 .36 .12 .00 .00
1965 34 .29 .24 .17 .20
Totaib 313 A6 Al AS
3. Professor Elman's thesis implies that an agency in which prosecu-
tion and adjudication are combined will be less reluctant to dismiss a case
inwhich legal issues predominate than one in which factual issues pre-
dominate. Since the scope ofjudicial review of administrative action is
broader with respect to questions of law than with respect to questions
of facts, an agency has little to gain by distorting the applicable law
whereas it may get away with a certain amount of tendentious fact-find-
ing.
Table 11 attempts to test this implication of the Elman thesis by
comparing NLRB dismissal rates at various periods for a type of case—
cases in which an employer is charged with discriminating against an em-
ployee or employees because of union activities —inwhich factual ques-
tions, primarily motive, predominate. If the Elman thesis is correct, the
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1935—36 42 16 2 .38 .05
1938 29 23 . 8 .79 .28













1956 30 14 5 .47 .17
1969 29 9 6 .31 .21
Totalb 59 23 11 39 .19
SOURCE. —Decisionsand Orders of the National Labor Relations Board, vols.
1, 8,69,72, 115, 178.
aThatis, of discrimination count or counts.
b Or average.
fair labor practice cases prior to the separations of functions in 1942 or
1947; a comparison with Table 6 shows that it is not.34
Table 11 also permits a comparison among dismissal rates at different
stages in the Board's evolution that is unaffected by changes either in
substantive law (the prohibition against employer discrimination has re-
mained unchanged since the Wagner Act) or in the agency's mix of cases.
According to Table lithe dismissal rate has not been affected by the suc-
cessive changes in the Board's structure with respect to the separation of
functions.
4. It should also follow from the Elman thesis that an agency in
which prosecution and adjudication are combined will, other things being
equal, dismiss a smaller fraction of major cases, so classified by the
amount of agency resources consumed in their prosecution, than of minor
cases. Criticism of an agency for having wasted the taxpayer's money by
bringing an unmeritorious case is more apt to be forthcoming and per-
suasive when the amount squandered is substantial.
34. The low rate of dismissals in the first year of the Board's operations, 1935—36, is
consistent with data obtained for all unfair labor practice cases, but not reported in
Table 5 or 6, from the first volume of the Board's decisions. The dismissal rates in that
volume are .06 (significant dismissals) and .00 (significant total dismissals).250 THE BEHAVIOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Unfortunately other things are not equal. Although the FTC does
dismiss a higher proportion of its larger cases (the statistics were pre-
sented in Table 3), the model developed in Part I of this article suggests
that there are reasons for this that have nothing to do with the presence
or absence of bias. Table 3 can be made to bear on the present question,
however, if another column is added —oneshowing the percentage of all
cases, settled as well as litigated, that are dismissed (Table 12). It appears
that in many periods a large fraction of the Commission's antitrust
prosecutions, and hence in resource terms a large fraction of the Com-
mission's entire enforcement activity, have not resulted in the entry of
remedial orders. So marked a propensity to rule in favor of the defendant
is difficult to reconcile with the Elman thesis.
5. The Elman thesis would seem to imply that the members of an
agency in which prosecution and adjudication are combined would be less
reluctant to dismiss a complaint that had been authorized by their prede-
cessors in office than one they themselves had authorized. In the former
case they could not properly be criticized for having initiated a case that
lacked merit; in the latter case they could. The low rate of ungrudging
TABLE 12
DISMISSAL RATE—FTC ANTITRUST CASESa INCLUDING SETTLED CASES
Percentage

















SOURCE.—See Table 3, supra.
a Excludingcases brought exclusively under one of the minor Robinson-Pat-
manAct amendments. See note 10, supra.
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dismissals disclosed by Table 10 for the period up to 1945 may appear to
support this hypothesis, for it was a period in which nearly all the cases
decided by the members of the Commission had been authorized by the
very same members.35 In subsequent periods the average tenure of the
members of the Commission is much shorter.
But an inference that members of the Commission are more prone to
dismiss complaints of their predecessors than their own complaints ëan-
not in fact be drawn from these data. As explained earlier, the decline in
the proportion of grudging dismissals appears to reflect the gradual
adoption of a policy of stating reasons for dismissing a complaint rather
than the length of service of the commissioners in relation to the cases
they decide. If we ignore, therefore, whether a dismissal is grudging or
ungrudging and consider only whether it is significant, we find that the
dismissal rate is no higher after 1945, despite the reduction in the com-
missioners' average length of service.
Further evidence is presented in Tables 13 through 15, which
analyze the later periods in detail. The last column in each box in Table
13 shows the percentage dismissed of cases in which all five members of
the Commission who decided the case had also been members when the
complaint was issued, cases in which four members of the Commission
who decided the case had also been members when the complaint was
issued, and so on down to zero (i.e., none of the incumbents were mem-
bers of the Commission when the complaint was issued), in various
periods. If members of the Commission are reluctant to dismiss their own
complaints but less reluctant to dismiss those of their predecessors the
percentage of dismissals should increase as we move down the columns.
If dismissals are grouped according to whether three or more or two
or fewer commissioners deciding the case were members of the Com-
mission when the complaint was issued, the dismissal rate is indeed
higher in the second group (Table 14). The difference, however, is not
statistically significant. Moreover, contrary to the prediction derived
from the Elman thesis, the highest rate of dismissal is found where all five
members of the Commission were members when the complaint was is-
sued (the number of cases, however, is too small to be significant); and
the rate of dismissal is the same where three members of the Commission
when the case was decided were members when the complaint was issued
as it is where only one present member of the Commission was also a
member when the complaint was issued.
he minor Robinson-Pat-
35. In 1938 the most junior member of the Commission had sat for three years and
only two cases decided that year had been instituted prior to his appointment. In 1941 the










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DISMISSAL a RATE AS A FUNCTION OF WHETHER COMMISSIONERS
DECIDING CASE WERE MEMBERS WHEN COMPLAINT WAS ISSUED—
SUMMARY OF TABLE 13
253
No. of Commissioners
Who Were Members Both When
the Complaint Was Issued and
When the Case Was Decided0
AllPeriods
Order Dis. Total % Dis.
5 2 4 6 .67
4 61 15 76 .20
3 36 6 42 .14
2 30 13 43 .30
1 32 8 40 .20
0 11 5 16 .31
172 51 223 .23
3.-S 99 25 124 .20
0—2 73 26 99 .26
















SOURCE. —Table 13, supra.
a"Ungrudging" total dismissals as defined in the text.
bExcludingmembers who dissented from or did not participate in the Com-
mission's decision.
c Or average.
Tables 13 and 14 count only commissioners voting with the ma-
jority, either to dismiss or to enter a remedial order. The votes of dis-
senters are treated separately in Table 15. If members of the Commission
were more reluctant to dismiss their own complaints than their predeces-
sors', then we would expect old members (members both when the com-
plaint was issued and when the case was decided) to dissent more fre-
quently when the majority voted to dismiss the complaint than when the
majority voted to enter an order. Table 15 indicates, however, that old
members voted to dismiss the complaint —theircomplaint, as it were —13
times when the majority voted to enter a remedial order, and voted only
four times to enter an order when the majority voted to dismiss the com-
plaint.36
36. It is of course possible for an "old" member voting against the complaint to have
dissented from the original action of the Commission in issuing the complaint, in which
event his later vote would be no evidence of open-mindedness. Unfortunately, data on vot-254 THEBEHAVIOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
ing at the complaint-issuance stage are unavailable. It should be noted, however, that
under the Elman view the commissioner who voted against issuing the complaint in the first
place would still feel considerable pressure to enter a cease and desist order after the trial
in order to protect the agency against charges of having wasted the taxpayer's money and in


























VOTES OF DISSENTING FTCCOMMISSIONERS— 1946-65
I.
Natureof Vote
For Issuance of For Dismissal of
Remedial Order Complaint
By By By By
Commissioner CommissionerCommissioner Commissioner
Who WasWho Was NotWho WasWho Was Not
Member Member Member Member
When Corn-When Corn-When Corn-When Com-
plaint Was plaint Was plaint Was plaint Was
Period Number Issued Issued Issued Issued
1946—47 3 3 — — —
1949—50 — — — — —
1951—52 3 — — 3 —
1955—56 9 — — 9 —






4 6 13 4
SouRcE.—See Table 13, supra.
6.If the combination of prosecution and adjudication makes an
agency reluctant to dismiss unmeritorious complaints and thus prone to
enter unjustified orders, one would expect the orders of such an agency
to be reversed more frequently on judicial review than the orders of an
agency in which the functions are separated. Table 16 seeks to test this
hypothesis by comparing, for a few randomly selected periods, the re-
suits of judicial review of FTC cease and desist orders and orders in
NLRB unfair labor practice cases. Employer discrimination cases are
reported separately to facilitate comparison between the preseparated
and the separated Board.
Table 16 shows not only that the FTC has fared consistently better
on judicial review than the Board, but also (and more pertinently, since












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5256 THE BEHAVIOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
agency's p On judicial review) that the Board's record has actually
worsened since separation, both generally and with respect to discrimina-
tion cases alone. However, Table 16 also reveals secular changes in the
outcome of judicial review of agency action that cannot be ascribed to
the combination or separation of functions and that may conceal the
effect of separation.
7. Finally, an agency in which prosecution and adjudication are
combined is, under the Elman thesis, one much concerned about being
criticized for dismissing complaints but relatively unconcerned about
its record on judicial review. (Were it greatly concerned about its court
record 'it would dismiss all doubtful cases in order to minimize the danger
of being reversed by a reviewing court.) This model would be more per-
suasive were there evidence that an agency like the FTC or NLRB was
judged, by those with power over the agency, more by its internal batting
average than by its success or failure in the courts. Some places to look
for such evidence are the agencies' annual reports, where the agency
boasts of its successful performance, presumably using criteria of success
persuasive to its intended audience; the agencies' annual appropriation
hearings before the House and Senate appropriation subcommittees; and
appraisals of the agencies' performance by critics or supporters. A search
of these sources reveals, however, many more references to the agency's
record on judicial review than to the rate at which either the FTC or the
NLRB dismisses complaints.
In one respect, though, dismissals clearly could affect an agency's
performance. Congress, the agencies, and their critics all seem greatly
concerned with the size of the agency's work load as measured by such
quantitative indicia as the number of charges filed with the agency, the
number of complaints issued, and the number of decisions. The routine
argument advanced for a larger appropriation is that the agency's work
load has grown faster than its budget, and an increase in work load is
difficult to demonstrate unless some quantitative change can be pointed
to. The routine criticism of an agency is that its budget is excessive in
relation to its present quantity of work. The effect of a dismissal may be
to compel the agency's staff, in similar future cases, to investigate more
thoroughly before recommending a complaint and to present more evi-
dence of violation at trial —inshort, to expend additional resources in the
prosecution of the case. This will reduce the number of cases it can bring
with reasonable prospect of success.
Such a process can be seen at work in the FTC in the middle and late
1960s. As Table 3 shows, in 1965 the Commission dismissed 60 per cent
of its contested antitrust cases. Many of these decisions established
higher standards for proving violations of law than had previously been
applied by the Comn
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applied by the Commission. By 1969 we find the American Bar Associa-
tion's Commission to Study the Federal Trade Commission blasting the
Commission for a precipitous decline in its work load as measured by
number of investigations, decisions, and other conventional quantitative
criteria of activity.37 The causation is complex but it would seem that one
of the reasons for the Commission's decline38 in number of cases was its
change of policy, reflected in the dismissals of the middle 1960s, in the
direction of more exacting standards of proof.
This history may influence the Commission's future decisions
whether or not to dismiss complaints, in circumstances where a dismissal
would increase the difficulty of proving a violation. But it is at least as
significant, in appraising the Elman thesis, to observe that the Com-
mission in 1965 was apparently not deterred by such a prospect from dis-
missing major cases with great frequency.
D. WHY WERE PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION SEPARATED AT
THE BOARD AND NOT AT THE
The results of our inquiry into whether the combination of prosecution
and adjudication biases an agency's adjudication, although hardly de-
finitive, suggest that it does not. If so, one may wonder why the Board
effected a limited separation in 1942, why Congress extended and formal-
ized the separation, apparently at some cost in efficiency,39 in 1947, and
how the FTC has escaped serious pressure for some form of separation.
The congressional hearings preceding enactment of the Taft-Hartley
Act developed no firm evidence of bias in adjudication traceable to the
combination of functions.4° And if separation was legislated because
combination was thought inherently unfair, it is hard to understand why
the combination of functions in the FTC has not only persisted but es-
caped sustained controversy.
The probable explanation for separation at the Labor Board lies not
in the merits of the issue but in its politics. The opposition of the business
community to the Wagner Act and its enforcing agency4' was better or-
37. See ABA Comm'n to Study the Federal Trade Commission, supranote9, at 16—26.
38. Which the ABA Commission, however, overstated. See Richard A. Posner, A
Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, supranote10, at 370.
39. See 2 Kenneth Cuip Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 13.05, pp. 206—1 1.
40. See id.at§ 13.05, pp. 204—5.
41. This opposition is described in Harry A. Millis & Emily Clark Brown, From the
Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley—A Study of National Labor Policy and Labor Relations 381—
91(1950).258 THE BEHAVIOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
ganized, more vocal, and more tenacious than the business community's
opposition to the FTC and the statutes it enforces has ever been. The
costs imposed by the Board on business were probably greater than those
imposed by the FTC—this might explain why greater resources were
marshaled against the Board than against the Commission. Probably, too,
it is easier to organize employers as an effective political pressure group
than the diffuse victims of FTC prosecution. At all events, within 12
years of the passage of the Wagner Act the opponents of that Act and of
the Board were able, in the Taft-Hartley Act, to effect a major overhaul of
the law. Charges of unfairness are a conventional refrain in the litany of
political controversy and once the Wagner Act was up for a thorough
overhaul it was relatively easy to amend the provisions of the Act relating
to the structure of enforcement as well as the substantive law provisions;
has never been a comparable overhaul of the Federal Trade Corn-
Act. That the separation of functions apparently imposed at least
short-term costs in the form of lowered efficiency due to problems of co-
ordination between the Board and the General Counsel provides a suffi-
cient explanation why the Board's opponents should have wanted to
bring about a separation of the functions regardless of the actual merits
of such a step.
What the last point may suggest is that administrative regulation can
perhaps best be understood when elements of the effective-political-
group and rational-utility-maximizing models of administrative agency
behavior are combined.
APPENDIX
PROOF THAT THE CONDITION FOR LITIGATION






Substituting this equation into inequality (15), the condition for litigation becomes
—e') s'e' rc' /1 — 1 +e'>—I—I 1+2——. s Ls'\\Q/ k
Sinces= s', thiscan be simplified to
Subtracting the first tern
we have
Since k > 1, the right sk























ment, 13 J. Law & Econ.
(Table 12).
aExcludingcases brc
amendments. See note 1(
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Subtractingthe first term on the left-hand side of the inequality from both sides,
we have
e'>e'
Since k> 1, the right side must exceed the left for any value of e',andthe con-
dition for litigation cannot be satisfied.
TABLE Al
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SOURCE. —RichardA. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforce-
ment, 13 J. Law & Econ. 365, 376 (Table 6), 379 (Table 9), 381 (Table 11), 382
(Table12).
aExcludingcases brought exclusively under the minor Robinson-Patman Act
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TABLE A2
















% With- Charges Charges
Cases drawn or Filed by Filed by
Period Pending Dismissedindividuals Individuals
1935—36 865 .32 N.A. N.A.
1936—37 3,124 .21 N.A. N.A.
8,213 .31 .29 .08
1938—39 7,132 .25 .24 .09
1939—40 6,836 .33 .30 .11
1940—41 6,981 .30 .28 .09
Total a 33,151 .29 .28 .09"
1943—44 3,896 .42 N.A. .09
1944—45 3,633 .42 N.A. .09
1945—46 5,126 .40 N.A. .06
1946—47 6,457 .45 N.A. .06
Total a 19,112 .42. — .07
1948—49 5,543 .43 N.A. .38
1949—50 6,635 .43 N.A. .33
1950—51 8,504 .35 N.A. .33
1951—52 6,676 .45 N.A. .27
Total a 27,358 .41 — .33
1955—56 5,326 .57 N.A. .36
1959—60 11,121 .54 N.A. .46
1961—62 12,186 .50 N.A. .38
1965—66 15,632 .44 N.A. .29
1968—69 17,559 .47 N.A. .34














SouRcE.—See Table 8, supra.
a Or average.
"Excluding 1935—1937.—
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